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REVENGE OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA: THE RISE AND FALL OF NAPSTER*
VICKIE L. FEEMAN, WILLIAM S. COATS, HEATHER D. RAFTER, AND
JOHN G. GIVEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
It is rare that intellectual property lawyers have the opportunity
to be the focus of intense media attention, but A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.,1 is a unique case that has caught the attention of the
general public. The media concentration on the Napster case is not
surprising, considering that Napster had 90,000,000 registered
users, which is a significant percentage of the world's internet com-
munity.2 Amazingly, one hundred users were connected to Napster
every second, and those users shared ten thousand music files every
second. 3 Indeed, at any moment over eight million infringing files
were available to Napster users, including nearly all of the most
popular rock and pop tunes of all time.4
* For information regarding the Record Industry Association of America
("RIAA"), see http://www.RLAA.org.
** Heather Rafter (hrafter@digidesign.com) is General Counsel at Di-
gidesign, a division of Avid Technology, Inc., located in Palo Alto, California. Di-
gidesign is a leading developer of hardware and software used to record, edit, mix
and master sound for the professional music, film, video and multimedia indus-
tries. Bill Coats (wcoats@orrick.com) and Vickie Feeman (vfeeman@orrick.com)
are members of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. John Given
(jgiven@digidesign.com) is a staff attorney at Digidesign. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the authors' or their respec-
tive companies or firms.
1. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Napster II").
2. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (indicating that at one point defendant estimated that Napster was growing
by more than 200 percent per month) ("Napster I"), affd, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
3. See id. (noting Napster's popularity without marketing).
4. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for SummaryJudgment on Lia-
bility and Willfulness, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof at 7 n.5, Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C 00-0074
MHP) available at http://www.riaa.com/pdf/PlaintiffsSJM.pdf (last visited Aug. 7,
2001) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judg-
ment]. For example, Unchained Melody by the RIGHTEOUs BROTHERS and Jailhouse
Rock by ELvis PiRFsLEY "remained available on Napster long after plaintiffs had
given notice" of copyright infringement. Id.
(35)
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In contrast, the most successful record of 2000 sold less than
ten million copies. 5 The most popular movie in 2001, Shrek, was
seen by approximately twenty million movie goers, and all television
networks together will have only 48.15 million viewers a week. 6
The most watched television show of all time, the final episode of
M*A*S*H in 1983, had only fifty million viewers. 7 With popularity
like that, there is little wonder that Napster received the full atten-
tion of the Record Industry Association of America ("RLAA"). The
record industry is a thirty-seven billion dollars industry worldwide,
with approximately sixteen billion dollars in U.S. sales. 8 The record
industry saw the technological changes represented by Napster as a
serious threat to its financial health. 9 If people could get their mu-
sic for free over Napster, the record labels were concerned that
there would be no need for consumers to buy records.' 0 In addi-
tion, many artists were concerned that they would lose their royalty
streams from their recordings and their publishing rights." As a
5. See The Best Selling Albums of 2000 at http://www.neosoul.ccm/music/
2000/osalbums.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2001) (listing 'N Syncs' "No Strings At-
tached" sold 9.94 million copies in U.S. in 2000).
6. See DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 6, 2001, at 10.
7. See Top Shows of All Time, VARiETY.COM, at http://www.variety.com/index.
asp?layout=chart.pass&charttype=charttopshowsalltime (last visited Aug. 6,
2000). But see Geoff Boucher, Celebrities Take to the Stage, Phones in Global Telethon,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/
la-092201tv.story (Sept. 22, 2001) (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) (estimating number
of viewers for M*A*S*H finale at 106 million).
8. "Total worldwide sales in the year 2000 were approximately $37 billion and
U.S. sales were approximately 15.8 billion. 2.5 billion CD's were sold worldwide."
RIAA, RIAA YEAREND MARKET REPORT (2001).
9. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 4, at 5 (describing co-founder Shawn Fanning's opinion that purpose of Nap-
ster is to "'bypass the record industry entirely,' make record stores obsolete, and
'brin[g] about the death of the CD'").
10. See id. (explaining Napster's other co-founder, Parker's description of its
goals). The purpose of Napster is to "usurp the record industry as we know it
today, woo[ing] the [record] industry before we try to undermine it, and trans-
port[ing] music unhindered by cumbersome copyright schemes." Id. (quoting
Parker Depo. 160:1-162:14).
11. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that artists depend financially upon selling their
records because they earn royalties). With Napster, the artists do not get a royalty
when a Napster user downloads or uploads one of their songs. See id; see also Benny
Evangelista, Bay Area Firms Turn Up Volume With MP3s: Some Bay Area firms hope to
make CD's a thing of the past by selling pirate-proof Web music, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11,
1999, at C1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/Chroni
cle/archive/1999/01/11/BU44668.DTL (last visited Dec. 27, 2001) (noting
RIAA's view that "the distribution of those songs, especially music by artists under
contract to the major record labels, violates copyright laws and reduces their sales
revenues").
[Vol. 9: p. 35
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result, the music industry brought copyright claims against Napster
to determine Napster's fate.12
II. THE CHANGING FACE OF MUSIC ONLINE
Traditionally, the sale of music to consumers has been domi-
nated by a small group of large record labels that sell directly to
national retailers or through sizeable distributors to a vast array of
local retailers. Approximately eighty percent of the popular music
industry is controlled by the record companies known as the Big
Five: BMG Entertainment, Sony Music, Warner Music Group, EMI
Recorded Music and Universal Music Group. 13 Those companies
are members of the RLAA, which has lead the struggle against
Napster. 14
Digital distribution of music over the Internet could drastically
alter the dominant role of large record labels. In 1993, a group of
college friends founded Internet Underground Music Archive
("IUMA"), the first high fidelity site on the World Wide Web, now
defunct. 15 The underlying idea of IUMA was to use web technology
to provide artists a cheap and easy way to distribute their music. 1
6
Unlike traditional avenues of distribution, the Internet offers a low-
cost method to upload music files and instantly disseminate them
worldwide.1 7 Any artist could create his or her own site on IUMA
by simply paying a nominal subscription fee.18 The site enabled
artists to sell albums and other merchandise online. 19 However,
12. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (indicating plaintiff's cause of action
against Napster).
13. See Evangelista, supra note 11, at Cl (stating Big Five record labels "already
worry that MP3s are just the tip of an iceberg that could sink their record-distribu-
tion structure"). But see CNNMoney, Warner, EMI Harmonize, Jan. 24, 2000, at
http://money.cnn.com/2000/01/24/worldbiz/eminew (last visited Apr. 1, 2000)
(indicating that in January 2000, Big Five became four when EMI and Warner
initiated merger).
14. See Evangelista, supra note 11, at C1 (noting MP3 music demonstrates how
easy it is for songs to be sold over Internet directly from artist to consumer, bypas-
sing traditional middlemen like retail stores, CD-makers, music distributors, whole-
salers or even record companies).
15. SeeJoan Anderman, Wired for Sound, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1998, at D1
(noting IUMA included 1,600 bands and thirty independent record labels).
16. See id. (explaining idea of technology providing simple and inexpensive
alternative to corporate promotion and distribution was brand new but growing
phenomenon).
17. See id. (listing major record labels, radio, music press and MTV as tradi-
tional avenues).
18. See About IUMA: History, at http://www.iuma.com/About (last visited Feb.
23, 2002) (providing brief history of IUMA). Please note that on the date this page
was last visited, IUMA was providing its services to artists for free. See id.
19. See id. (noting that IUMA also allowed bands to interact with fans online).
20021
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IUMA has suffered the fate of many pioneers, being bought out by
EMusic20 , and ultimately closed down.2 1 EMusic was in turn bought
by Vivendi Universal. 22
Today there are dozens of other online storefronts, including
www.musicboulevard.com, www.amazon.com, www.mp3.com, www.
towerrecords.com and www.cdnow.com. 23 Similar to IUMA, these
sites offer numerous advantages to users, including the ability to
hear music samples, obtain information about the artist and order
music easily.24 These advantages guarantee that online music distri-
bution will continue to grow. For example, in 1996, U.S. online
sales of prerecorded music totaled fourteen million dollars; by
1998, that figure had grown to eighty-eight million dollars.25 It is
estimated that sales of prerecorded music online will reach nearly
$1.4 billion, or at least eight percent of all U.S. music sales in the
future.26
Currently there are over 80,000 music sites on the Internet. 27
Not every music site, however, is dedicated to the sale of prer-
ecorded music online. Some are fan sites, others are devoted to
internet radio broadcasting or "webcasting," and still others are de-
20. See Press Release, IUMA, E.Music.com Completes Acquisition of IUMA,
(June 16, 1999), at http://www.iuma.com/About/pagePressRelease_2.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2002) (explaining IUMA would be operated as an independent
web site).
21. See Press Release, IUMA, IUMA Suspends Operations (Feb. 7, 2001), at
http://www.iuma.com/About/pagePressRelease_16a.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2002) (citing Emusic's decision not to renew funding as reason for IUMA's shut-
down). Vitiminic USA, Inc. acquired IUMA, however, and relaunched IUMA's
web site. See Press Release, IUMA, Vitaminic Re-launches Indie Artist Site IUMA
(Apr. 6, 2001), at http://www.iuma.com/About/pagePressRelease_18.html. (dis-
cussing Vitiminic's acquisition of IUMA).
22. SeeJames Evans, EMusic Bought by Universal for $24.6 Million, Apr. 9, 2001
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,46704,00.asp (detailing sale of
Emusic for $24.6 million).
23. See generally http://www.musicboulevard.com; http://www.amazon.com;
http://www.mp3.com; http://www.towerrecords.com; http://www.cdnow.com.
24. For web site options for users, see http://www.musicboulevard.com;
http://www.amazon.com; http://www.mp3.com; http://www.towerrecords.com;
http://www.cdnow.com.
25. See JUPITER COMMUNICATIONS, 2 Music INDUSTRY AND THE INTERNET: US-
AGE, RETAIL AND DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION PROJECrIONS 5 (1988) [hereinafterJuPITER
REPORT].
26. See id.
27. See Paul Keegan, Making Beautiful Music on the Net, UPSIDE TODAY, July 21,
1998, at 84 (noting music industry executives admit Internet could help expand
industry globally).
[Vol. 9: p. 35
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voted to peer-to-peer file sharing technologies that enable wide-
spread swapping of music files over the Internet. 28
A. Streaming And Digital Downloading Technologies Make
Online Distribution Of Music Possible
The Web offers a variety of technologies for disseminating mu-
sic and video online.29 One type of technology is "streaming me-
dia," which is the live distribution of music or video online in which
no permanent copy is created on the downloader's system.30 The
quality of this music is lower than the quality of a CD. Many web
sites selling music online offer audio streaming technology that
provides the opportunity to preview clips from an artist in real
time.31 Another type of technology, digital distribution, is the
downloading of a complete audio content file, which may have the
sound quality of a CD. 32 Once downloaded, the files can be re-
tained by the customer and played on demand. 33
B. MP3 Compression Technology Makes Online Distribution Of
Music Quicker And More Feasible
There are several competing formats struggling to become the
standard for the digital downloading of music. These formats in-
clude a2b, realaudio, liquidaudio and MP3. Of these formats, MP3
has gained the most popularity among consumers and has caused
the greatest uproar in traditional music circles. MP3 stands for Mo-
28. See id. (noting urgency of major record labels to cut down on privacy and
ensure copyright protection).
29. For a discussion of different technologies, see infra notes 34-51 and ac-
companying text.
30. See HIGH-TECH DICTIONARY, at http://www.computeruser.com/resources/
dictionary/noframes/nf.definition.html?bG9va3VwPTQ5Nzk (last visited Feb. 23,
2002) (defining streaming as "playing audio or video immediately as it is
downloaded from the Internet, rather than storing it in a file on the receiving
computer first").
31. See, e.g., Emusic, at http://www.emusic.com; CD Now, at http://www.
cdnow.com (providing preview clips); MRV Communication Inc., at http://www.
mrv.com; CNN, at http://www.cnn.com; Garbage Band, at http://www.garage
band.com; Kill Pop Radio, at http://www.killpopradio.com; Yahoo! Broadcast, at
http://www.broadcast.com (offering streaming media).
32. Digital distribution is a phrase coined in the JUPITER REPORT, supra note
26, and is not the only term defining the downloading of music from the Internet
onto a computer hard drive. Nonetheless, use of the terms "streaming media" and
"digital downloading" is a good way to differentiate between the two. Sites that
allow digital distribution of audio content, at least of individual songs, include
http://www.emusic.com and http://www.mp3.com. For the federal law requiring
compulsory license for making and distributing phonotecards, see 17 U.S.C. § 115
(2001).
33. SeeJUPITER REPORT, supra note 26.
2002]
5
Feeman: Revenge of the Record Industry Association of America: The Rise a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
40 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
tion Picture Experts Group ("MPEG") one layer three, which is a
method of compressing audio files into digital format that takes up
only one-tenth of the computer memory used by previous technolo-
gies.3 4 As an example, where it used to take ten hours to download
a record album in wav file format, an MP3 user can download the
same amount of music in ten minutes.35 MP3, as with other similar
formats, also permits the downloading of near perfect digital copies
of music, with very little deterioration in quality.
36
Further, not only can users download existing songs over the
Internet using MP3 technology, they can also forward songs quickly
to other people.37 Users load a CD into their computer and using
an MP3 translation program, "rip" the wave files off the CD, convert
them to the MP3 format, and send the song over a standard in-
ternet connection to someone else or to a website. 38 This entire
process takes about twenty minutes, depending upon the user's
connection speed. Sending the same uncompressed song would
take more than three hours.3 9 Software for playing these "ripped"
audio files are available free of charge on the Internet.40 MP3's
34. See Ron Harris, New Technology Could Change Music Industry, Consumer Hab-
its, Dec. 12, 1998, at http://www.onlineathens.com/1998/121298/1212.a33mp.
html (last visited Dec. 27, 2001) (indicating that MP3 can change how consumers
purchase and listen to music); see also Michael Robertson, Top 10 Things Everyone
Should Know About MP3, July 23, 1998, at http://www.mp3.com/news/070.html
(last visited Dec. 27, 2001) (stating facts regarding MP3 including: "1) MP3 is not
illegal, it is simply an audio compression format .... 2) MP3 is the standard for
high quality music and will soon be on every PC .... 3) MP3 gives artists and labels
freedom to market and sell their music anyway they wish .... 4) Hundreds of
companies are building businesses around MP3 .... 5) Thousands of artists are
distributing content in MP3 today .... 6) MP3 is the most cost effective and easy
way for artists to explore online music .... 7) MP3 can be as secure as any current
audio format .... 8) The music industry is not losing billions to MP3 .... 9) Artists
and labels can make money employing MP3 technology on the net .... 10) MP3
users should respect copyrights").
35. See Harris, supra note 34 ("What MP3 can do in one hour, it takes 20
hours for an earlier technology, WAV.").
36. See HIGH-TECH DICTIONARY, at http://www.computeruser.com/resources/
dictionary/noframes/nf.definition.html?bG9va3VwPTc5ODU (last visited Feb. 23,
2002) (defining MP3 as technology that "creates sound files a tenth the size of
standard CD music files with very little loss of sound quality.").
37. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating how Nap-
ster aids transmission of MP3 files between users).
38. See id. (explaining process of how users transfer songs on Internet).
39. See id. (noting downloading process described above might be violation of
copyright laws, but is nonetheless common practice among MP3 users).
40. See, e.g., Real.com, at http://www.real.com (providing realaudio software,
available at no cost); Liquid Audio, at http://www.liquidaudio.com (providing li-
quidaudio software); Windows Media Technologies, at http://microsoft.com/win-
dows/windowsmedia/download/ (providing Microsoft's Media Player, available
for free download).
[Vol. 9: p. 35
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capability to quickly and inexpensively distribute near-perfect com-
pressed copies of music threatens the established music industry be-
cause it increases the risk of music piracy.
C. Peer-To-Peer File Sharing Technology Fosters Widespread
Distribution Of Pirated Music Over The Internet
In 1999, a small start-up company in California launched an
MP3 file-sharing system known as Napster, which substantially in-
creased the risk of music piracy over the Internet.41 Using a process
now commonly referred to as "peer-to-peer" file sharing, Napster
enabled users to make MP3 files stored on their computers availa-
ble for copying by other users. 42 It further enabled users to search
each other's computers for such music files and to transfer exact
copies of those files.43 Napster thus made it easy to find pirated
music on the Internet, simplifying what had been a laborious and
time consuming task.44
At its peak, Napster had over ninety million registered users. 45
Approximately one hundred of those users attempted to connect to
the system every second, and each second about ten thousand mu-
sic files were shared using Napster.46 The site became so popular
that a number of colleges banned students from using Napster
through the colleges' servers because those servers were being over-
loaded by the students' prolific file swapping.47
41. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (describing Nap-
ster's business), affd, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
42. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1011 (explaining how Napster facilitates trans-
mission of MP3 files between its users).
43. See id. (indicating how users utilized Napster).
44. See id. ("These functions are made possible by Napster's MusicShare
software, available free of charge from Napster's internet site, and Napster's net-
work servers and server side software.").
45. SeeJohn Borland, Napster to Voluntarily Halt Song Trades, CNET NEws.coM,
Mar. 2, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-5005980.html?tag=
st.cn.l.lthd (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (noting there exist other companies similar
to Napster that will attract Napster's 64 million users).
46. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (indicating popularity of Napster).
47. See Warren Cohen, Napster is Rocking the Music Industry, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, March 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7717576 (describing how Nap-
ster operates). Napster is trying to reconfigure its software to prevent banning by
colleges and universities. See id.; see also John Borland & Rachel Konrad, Study
Finds Napster Use May Cut into Record Sales, CNET NEWS.COM, May 25, 2000, at http:/
/news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1945948.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (show-
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The RIAA commissioned a study that found that 87% of Nap-
ster users were involved in some form of copyright infringement.48
Napster's CEO responded that over 95% of all downloaded files are
soon erased, which weakened any argument that Napster was being
used to make permanent copies of recordings that might displace
conventional CD sales.49 Whether or not Napster harmed CD sales
was hotly disputed; a study by SoundScan indicated that it may
harm CD sales.50 A survey by the Normal Lear Center, however,
found that Napster had not harmed CD sales.51
III. WHY NAPSTER PLAYS THE BLUES
In 1999, the RIAA filed a complaint against Napster alleging
that Napster facilitated the exchange of pirated music in MP3 files
and was therefore a contributory copyright infringer or vicariously
liable for copyright infringement.52 Napster, however, maintained
it was protected by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
48. See Napster , 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (citing study performed by Dr. Ingram
Olkin showing eighty-seven percent of files sampled belonged to or were adminis-
tered by plaintiffs); see alsoJonathan Cohen, Editorial, RJAA Seeks Injunction Against
Napster, Bu oARD DAILY Music NEWS, June 13, 2000, at http://www.billboard-on-
line.com/daily/2000/0613-05.asp.
49. See Record Industry Seeks Napster Injunction, REUTERS, June 13, 2000, at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2586820,OO.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2001) (arguing that Napster did not damage music industry) [herinafter
Record Industry Seeks Napster Injunction]. Napster's CEO Hank Berry, in a prepared
statement, said that "[p]eople are sharing over Napster, not selling.... Napster is
doing no harm to the record industry. By their own numbers, record sales are up,
and file sharing has proven to be a great promotional tool." Id
50. See Borland, supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Borland & Kon-
rad, supra note 47 (finding that record purchases decreased four percent in stores
near universities).
51. See Sue Zeidler, Napster Prepares New Defense, Weighs New Business Models,
REUTERS, June 23, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/23/tech.napster.
reut/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2001); see also Napster or Not, CD Sales Are
Strong, REuTERS, July 19, 2000, at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/O,
4586,2605429,000.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2001) (demonstrating that in 2000,
album sales increased eight percent from 1999).
52. See Complaint for Copyright Infringement Against Napster, available at
http://www.riaa.com/PDF/Napster_-Complaint.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2001).
[Vol. 9: p. 35
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under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) 53 and sought summary judgment on that
basis.
5 4
1. The District Court Rejects Napster's DMCA Defense
Judge Patel rejected Napster's DMCA defense in an opinion
issued on May 5, 2000. In determining that Napster did not qualify
for the "online service provider" ("ISP") safe harbor provision of
section 512(a), the district court focused on whether MP3 files were
actually transmitted, routed or connected "through" Napster's
server.55 Finding that the Napster server acts to establish a connec-
tion directly between the requesting and host user computers, the
court concluded that the connection, transmission and routing
goes between parts of the Napster system and not through the Nap-
ster server.56 Napster was not "transmitting, routing or providing
connections for, material through a system or network controlled
or operated by [Napster]" within the meaning of section 512(a),
and therefore could not seek shelter under that provision from the
RLAA's claims of copyright infringement.57
The district court noted that allowing Napster protection
under section 512(a) would run contrary to the legislative intent
and history of the section.5 8 The section 512(a) safe harbor should
only apply when the service provider is acting as a conduit for the
communications of others.59 Because Napster "undisputedly per-
53. The DMCA includes a provision, which expressly limits the liability of "on-
line service providers" ("ISP"). See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (2001). If an ISP follows the procedures set forth in the DMCA, it has no
liability for transmitting, routing or providing Internet connections for infringing
materials; temporarily storing infringing materials; storing infringing materials at
the direction of a user; or connecting users to infringing materials through locator
or search tools. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d). Those safe harbors limit the ISP's
liability for direct, vicarious or contributory infringement under existing principles
of copyright law. They do not affect any other defense that an ISP may have
against copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(1). The DMCA also limits ISP
liability for good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, allegedly infringing
materials from the Internet. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
54. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 995183, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243, at *29-30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1999) (denying summary judgment).
55. See id. at *20 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) 2000).
56. See id. at *22 (denying protection under § 512(a)).
57. Id. at *21-23. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not adopt this position,
and instead held that the issue must be more fully developed at trial because there
are "serious questions" about whether Napster qualifies as an ISP as well as other
questions regarding how the facts of this case affect application of 17 U.S.C. § 512.
See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. See Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *24.
59. See id. at *24 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-55, pt. II, (1998), available at 1998
WL 414916, at *13).
2002]
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forms some information location functions," the court concluded
that some functions, such as Napster's search engine and index,
might qualify for protection under section 512(d). 60 Thus, while
the district court was unwilling to grant Napster safe harbor as a
conduit through which MP3 files are transmitted, it has allowed
room for possible limited protection under the statute as informa-
tion location tools. 61
2. The District Court Enjoins Napster Based On Likelihood Of
Contributory Infringement
Following Judge Patel's order, the RIAA sought a preliminary
injunction on June 12, 2000, to prevent Napster from facilitating
"music piracy" by its transmission and/or distribution of copy-
righted musical works. 62 In an interesting and ironic turn of events,
MP3.com CEO Michael Robertson submitted a declaration support-
ing the motion, alleging that Napster had not been authorized by
MP3.com to distribute the music of its artists. 63 David Boies, special
counsel for the government in its Microsoft antitrust case, was hired
by Napster in a futile effort to improve its situation. 64 It was to no
avail; Judge Patel held that Napster was likely to be found to be a
contributory infringer and issued an injunction against Napster on
July 26, 2000.65 The Ninth Circuit stayed that injunction pending
appeal on July 28, 2000, in an order issued by Judges Kozinski and
Silverman. 66
60. See id. at *18-19. Section 512(d) of the DMCA provides a safe harbor for
service providers "referring or linking users to an online location containing in-
fringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, includ-
ing directory, index, reference, pointer or hypertext link .... " 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)
(2001). The eligibility requirements for subsection 512(d) are more stringent
than the eligibility requirements for subsection 512(a). Compare 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(a) with 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
61. See Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *18-19 n. 6. For an entire dis-
cussion of Napster's possible protection under § 512(d), see id. at *14-19.
62. See Record Industy Seeks Napster Injunction, supra note 49 (discussing
groups' argument that studies showed Napster decreased CD sales).
63. See id. The RIAA has sued MP3.com for copyright infringement and pre-
vailed against it on April 28, 2000. SeeJohn Boland, MP3.com Loses Legal Battle to
RIAA, Apr. 28, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1776075.html.
Judge Jed S. Rakoff's ruling was: "Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment
holding defendant liable for copyright infringement is hereby granted." Id.
64. See Napster Gets High-Profile Lawyer for Case, REuTERs, June 16, 2000, at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2079640,00.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002)
(discussing legal battle between Napster and record industry).
65. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that complaint
alleged Napster was contributory and vicarious copyright infringer). The Ninth
Circuit granted plaintiffs motion of preliminary injunction. See id.
66. See id. (noting entry of temporary stay).
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3. The Ninth Circuit Nips Napster
The Ninth Circuit released its widely anticipated decision on
February 12, 2001, agreeing with the district court that Napster
could be held liable for its users' infringement, yet concluding that
the injunction entered by that court was overbroad. 67 The Ninth
Circuit also rejected all of Napster's defenses to copyright infringe-
ment, including fair use and statutory safe harbors.68
a. Napster's Third-Party Liability For Copyright Infringement
(1) Contributory Infringement
A third party is liable for contributing to the infringement of
another when it knows of the direct infringement and materially
contributes to that infringement. 69 Because Napster provided the
site and facilities that enabled its users' direct infringement, there
was little doubt that Napster materially contributed to that infringe-
ment.70  The Ninth Circuit's analysis, therefore, focused on
whether Napster had knowledge of that infringement. 71
Napster argued that its technology had a substantial nonin-
fringing use, and that under the Supreme Court's decision in Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,72 it could not be held liable for
contributory infringement.73 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the
Napster technology was capable of commercially significant nonin-
fringing uses, because while the current level of noninfringing uses
was small, the capabilities of the Napster architecture could lead to
substantial noninfringing uses in the future.74 The district court, by
contrast, examined only the current uses of the Napster system to
determine whether the technology had a substantial noninfringing
67. See id. at 1020, 1024-25 (affirming in part, reversing in part, and
remanding).
68. See id. (finding "[t]he district court did not err; Napster, by its conduct,
knowingly encourages and assists the infringement of plaintiff's copyrights").
69. See id. at 1019; see also Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding provider of site liable for known contributory copyright in-
fringement activity); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162-63 (2d Cir. 1971) (furthering how one is liable for infringement be-
cause promoter knew artists were performing copyrighted material).
70. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022.
71. See id. at 1020-22 (depicting court's analysis of knowledge requirement).
72. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
73. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020 (finding court disagreeing with Napster's
argument that Sony protects them from contributory liability).
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use, which the Ninth Circuit found erroneous. 75 The Ninth Circuit,
therefore, refused to "impute the requisite level of knowledge to
Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be
used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights. '76
Furthermore, the court determined that Napster had actual
and constructive knowledge of its users' infringement, due to plain-
tiffs' identification of infringing files listed on the service and Nap-
ster's own recognition that its users were engaged in trading pirated
music. 7 7 Sony notwithstanding, Napster could be held liable on the
basis of this actual knowledge because of its failure to block access
to its system by suppliers of infringing materials and its failure to
remove infringing materials. 78
There is an important distinction between this liability based
on "Napster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the
system" and potential liability based on "the architecture of the
Napster system" (which would be more analogous to the VCR in
Sony).79 In contrast to Sony, Napster had the ability to prevent, or
at least to limit, known infringement.8 0 The Sony defense of sub-
stantial non-infringing use therefore has limited application to a
computer system operator because of the ongoing conduct and in-
volvement of the operator.81
(2) Vicarious Infringement
A third party is liable for vicarious infringement when "the de-
fendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity
75. See id. (stating district court placed too much weight on current use and
too little weight on possible future uses).
76. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
77. See id. at 1020-22 (affirming district court's finding that Napster had actual
knowledge of infringing material on its system).
78. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021.
79. See id. at 1020.
80. See id. at 1022 (noting it could block suppliers' access to system that pro-
vides infringing material).
81. See id. at 1021. The court stated:
If a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material availa-
ble on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the
operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement. Conversely,
absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a com-
puter system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement
merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of
copyrighted material. To enjoin simply because a computer network al-
lows for infringing use would, in our opinion, violate Sony and potentially
restrict activity unrelated to infringing use.
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and also has a direct financial interest in such activities."8 2 In Nap-
ster, the Ninth Circuit determined that Napster was liable for vicari-
ous infringement. 83
Napster had a direct financial interest in its users' infringe-
ment because "[f] inancial benefit exists where the availability of in-
fringing material acts as a draw for customers." 84 Napster's future
revenue was directly dependent upon an increase in users, and
Napster's increasing user base was due to the availability of infring-
ing material. 85 Thus, Napster derived a financial benefit from the
availability of infringing material and therefore had a direct finan-
cial interest in the infringement.
8 6
The court also found that Napster had the right and ability to
supervise its users.8 7 Napster retained the right, under its agree-
ment with users, to terminate service if its users should violate appli-
cable law or for any reason, within Napster's sole discretion.88 To
escape vicarious liability, Napster was obligated to exercise its re-
served right to the fullest extent possible.89
Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
design of the Napster system provided only a limited ability to su-
pervise. 90 Napster could not read the content of the MP3 files in-
dexed on its servers and could not prevent every one of the
plaintiffs' copyrighted works from being exchanged over its ser-
82. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing test set forth in Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
83. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024. The court noted that the Sony substantial
noninfringing use defense does not apply to vicarious infringement. See id. This
statement by the court is one of Napster's chief complaints in its pending motion
for rehearing and rehearing en banc. See generally Petition of Appellant Napster,
Inc. for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
(9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2001) (No. 00-16401, 00-16403).
84. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Fonovisa,
76 F.3d at 263-64).
85. See id. (noting with rise in quality of works, user base increases).
86. See id. (concluding district court was correct in determining Napster finan-
cially benefited from availability of works on system).
87. See id. Napster retained the right to control access to its system through its
reservation of rights policy. See id. This policy was posted through its website. See
id.
88. See id. at 1023-24 (describing express reservation of rights policy).
89. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
90. See id. The Court noted: "The district court.., failed to recognize that
the boundaries of the premises that Napster 'controls and patrols' are limited ....
Put differently, Napster's reserved 'right and ability' to police is cabined by the
system's current architecture." Id.
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vice. 91 Napster did, however, have the ability to examine the file
names indexed on its servers (the same ability its users had), and
must therefore have used this ability to locate infringing
materials. 92
b. Scope Of The Injunction
The Ninth Circuit stated that a preliminary injunction against
Napster "[was] not only warranted but required."9 3 In light of its
rulings on the scope of Napster's contributory and vicarious liabil-
ity, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court's injunction
was overly broad and must be modified. 94 Under the district
court's injunction, Napster was given the entire burden to prevent
infringement of any of the plaintiffs' works. 95 The Ninth Circuit
held that plaintiffs should have the burden of providing notice to
Napster of copyrighted works available on its system (which would
trigger a finding of contributory infringement if access was not then
blocked).96 Napster should then bear the burden of disabling ac-
cess to identified works, as well as policing the system to the extent
feasible within the limits of the system.9 7 The Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to rework
the injunction such that: the plaintiffs bear the burden of providing
actual notice to Napster of copyrighted works available over the sys-
tem; and Napster bear the burden of patrolling the system for copy-
righted works using its file name search feature. 98
c. Napster's defenses to liability
Napster raised several defenses to ultimate liability.9 9 Fair use
and the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") are defenses to the
91. See id. at 1024 (stating some files are user-named and may not exactly
match copyrighted material, for example, songs could be incorrectly spelled).
92. See id. (stating Napster, users and plaintiffs have equal access to infringing
material).
93. Id. at 1027 (district court correctly recognized preliminary injunction
against Napster was required).
94. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1027 (stating without notice of specific infring-
ing files, Napster could not be found contributorily liable).
95. See id. at 1027 (placing burden on plaintiffs to provide notice).
96. See id. (stating duty of Napster to police system content arises after plain-
tiffs give notice of copyrighted works on system).
97. See id. (finding policing of files difficult because files are user named).
98. See id. at 1027-28 (noting district court should know on remand that Nap-
ster cannot access users' MP3 files through Napster system).
99. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014.
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direct liability of the users. 100 Without direct infringement by its
users, Napster would have no liability. The other defenses would
prevent holding Napster liable for its users' infringement.
(1) Fair use
Napster contended that its users engaged in fair use of copy-
righted material. 01 Section 107 of the Copyright Act sets out four
factors that courts are to examine in determining whether a use is
fair: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copy-
righted work, the portion of the copyrighted work used, and the
effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted work. 10 2
For the first factor - the purpose and character of the use - the
Ninth Circuit examined whether the use was transformative and
whether it was commercial. 10 3 If a use transforms the work, it is
more likely to be a fair use; if it is commercial, it is less likely to be a
fair use. 10 4 The court found that downloading music in MP3 for-
mat was simply retransmitting the work in a new medium, and thus
nontransformative. 10 5 As for whether the use was commercial, the
court found that "repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing
authorized copies,"' 0 6 or, in the words of the district court, "Nap-
ster users g[o]t for free something they would ordinarily have to
buy."10 7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that downloading mu-
sic in MP3 format constituted commercial use.' 08 The first factor,
the purpose and character of the use, therefore, weighed against a
finding of fair use.109
100. See id. at 1014, 1024-25 (describing factors used to determine fair use;
requirements of AHRA).
101. See id. (listing Napster's alleged fair uses).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (setting forth factors determining fair use).
103. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015 (noting transformative use adds more
purpose or character).
104. See id. (stating commercial use does not bar finding of fair use).
105. See id. ("Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when an original
work is merely retransmitted in a different medium.").
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
108. See NapsterI, 239 F.3d at 1015 ("In the record before us, commercial use
is demonstrated by a showing that repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies
of copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized
copies.").
109. See id. (holding that downloading of music is nontransformative, and re-




Feeman: Revenge of the Record Industry Association of America: The Rise a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
50 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
The court spent little time examining the second fair use fac-
tor - the nature of the use - and the third factor - the portion of
the copyrighted work used.110 In addressing both factors, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's findings that the copy-
righted works were creative in nature, as well as the finding that
Napster users use the full copyrighted work."' The findings of
both the nature of the use, and the portion used factors weighed
against fair use. 112 The court, however, specifically noted in the
portion used analysis, that just because the full work was used did
not preclude an ultimate finding of fair use. 113
The final factor was the effect of the use on the market for the
copyrighted work.1 14 The district court concluded, based on expert
testimony, that the use of Napster had a harmful effect in that it
reduced CD sales among college students and that it raised barriers
to plaintiffs' entry into the digital downloading market." 5 The
Ninth Circuit found that the district court's analysis of this issue was
not in error, and thus that this final factor also went against fair
use.11 6 Despite all four general fair use factors going against Nap-
ster, the court also examined two uses that Napster contended were
fair - sampling and space-shifting." 7 Napster argued that sampling
is simply the downloading of a song in order for users to decide
whether to purchase a recording." l8 Space-shifting is the
downloading of a song the user already owns so he can play it in a
110. See id. at 1016 (agreeing with district court on views of nature of use and
portion of work used).
111. See id. (stating that "plaintiffs copyrighted musical compositions and
sound recordings are creative in nature" and fair use is determined even when
"protected work is copied in its entirety").
112. See id. (noting copying of whole work "militates against a finding of fair
use").
113. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1016. "We note, however, that under certain
circumstances, a court will conclude that a use is fair even when the protected
work is copied in its entirety." Id.
114. See id. at 1016-17 ("[T]he importance of this [fourth] factor will vary, not
only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on
the other factors.").
115. See id. (stating that Napster harmed market in two different ways).
116. See id. at 1017 (noting that effects on emerging market can be consid-
ered harm). The "lack of harm to an established market cannot deprive the copy-
right holder of the right to develop alternative markets for the works." Id.
117. See id. at 1017-18 (discussing that identified uses of sampling and space-
shifting were never considered fair uses by district court).
118. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018 (arguing that sampling is not commercial
use, and it does not adversely affect market for copyrighted music, and should be
considered fair use).
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different location, such as an office.1 19 The court found neither of
these uses were fair uses under section 107.120
The court found sampling to be a commercial use and there-
fore less likely to be a fair use. 121 The court made this determina-
tion by comparing existing authorized samples with Napster
downloads. 122 Existing samples are highly regulated by the record-
ing industry and are merely partial or temporary copies of the over-
all work.123 Sampling via Napster, on the other hand, consists of
downloading a "full, free and permanent copy of the recording." 124
The court, therefore, concluded that sampling was commercial in
nature. 12 5 Napster claimed that sampling had a positive effect on
the market, leading to an increase in recording sales. 126 The court
stated that, even if true, such an effect would not help Napster. 127
As for space-shifting, Napster drew parallels with Sony12 8 and
Recording Industry Ass'n v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.1 29 The
court distinguished those cases on the grounds that the "shifting in
these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the
copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shift-
ing of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the origi-
nal user. 1 30 Because use of Napster for space-shifting files
119. See id. at 1019 (stating court already held space-shifting to be fair use in
other cases).
120. See id. (distinguishing other cases because shifting methods exposed ma-
terial only to original user).
121. See id. at 1018 (finding that district court did not err in holding sampling
not fair use).
122. See id. (describing copies available on Napster).
123. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018 (explaining that record companies give
song samples, consisting of only thirty-to-sixty seconds of free music).
124. Id.
125. See id. (affirming district court's determination as to commercial purpose
and character of sampling).
126. See id. (defending that market for audio CD's and market for online dis-
tribution are adversely affected by Napster's service).
127. See id. (stating that "increased sales of copyrighted material attributable
to unauthorized use should not deprive the copyright holder of the right to license
the material.").
128. See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (holding that home video tape recorder manufacturers, used by consuming
public to record programming, does not infringe on copyrights to television pro-
grams broadcast on public airwaves).
129. See generally 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2000) (deciding that manufacture
and distribution of digital audio recording device was not subject to restrictions of
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992).
130. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019.
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necessarily exposed those files to millions of users, it was not a fair
use.
131
(2) Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") Defense
Napster claimed that because its users were engaged in the
noncommercial use of a digital audio recording device to make dig-
ital music recordings, in accordance with section 1008 of the
AHRA, 132 then they could not be held liable for infringement. 133
The Ninth Circuit rejected this defense.134 The court held, consis-
tent with Diamond, that computers and their hard drives are not
digital audio recording devices under the AHRA "because their
'primary purpose' is not to make digital audio copied record-
ings.' 35 In addition, based on the legislative history of the AHRA,
the court found that songs fixed on computer hard drives are not
digital music recordings. 136
4. Napster's Next Tango
On March 5, 2001, the district court entered a modified - and
highly detailed - preliminary injunction.1 37 Under this injunction,
the recording industry bears the burden of notifying Napster of in-
131. See id. (discussing that in order to access music files on Napster, user
must list song and share it with other Napster users).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1999). "No action may be brought under this title
alleging infringement of copyright... based on the noncommercial use by a con-
sumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog
musical recordings." Id.
133. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024 (alleging that Napster's users engaged in
actions protected by § 1008 of the AHRA of 1992).
134. See id. (stating that AHRA does not cover downloading of MP3 files to
computer hard drives).
135. Id.; see also Recording Indus. Ass'n v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that computer hard drives do not
reproduce files from digital music recording).
136. See NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1024-25 (stating "computers do not make 'digi-
tal music recordings' as defined by the [AHRA]"). Napster also claimed that its
activities were protected under DMCA. See id. at 1025. In contrast to the district
court, the Ninth Circuit did not reject this defense entirely, but rather concluded
that the issue must be more fully developed at trial, because there are "serious
questions" about whether Napster qualifies as an internet service provider as well
as other questions regarding how the facts of this case affect the application of
§ 512. See id. The Ninth Circuit additionally concluded that there was no evidence
supporting Napster's other defenses of waiver, implied license and misuse. See id.
at 1026-27.
137. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001) (holding that Napster is enjoined from
copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound
recordings).
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fringing materials available on the system, and Napster bears the
burden of policing its system.' 3 8
On March 7, 2001, the producers of the Grammy Awards filed
an action against Napster, alleging that it was allowing its users to
trade music files from the show, including rap star Eminem's duet
with EltonJohn. 3 9 Shortly thereafter, Emusic likewise filed a copy-
right infringement suit against Napster. 140
In July, after a series of hearingsJudge Patel ordered that Nap-
ster's screening of infringing material must be 100% effective. 141
This ruling effectively closed Napster. The Ninth Circuit has stayed
that order pending full briefing of the issues, but Napster remains
shut down. 142 On August 7, the plaintiffs moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that Napster was liable for copyright infringe-
ment and that such infringement was willful. "Plaintiffs' motion
was stayed on February 22, 2002, because the court found that ques-
tions remained on ownership of the copyrights at issue and whether
certain of the plaintiffs' joint ventures for online licensing of music
are antitrust violations or establish copyright misuse. 1 43
IV. REVENGE IS BITTERSWEET
Although the music industry has thus far triumphed in its bat-
tle against Napster, the war against Internet file swapping has just
begun, and many predict that the millions of dollars spent to com-
bat Napster will be for naught. Napster's legal woes have appar-
ently not dampened the spirits of the peer-to-peer file sharing
community, as more systems continually emerge, many of which are
faster and more sophisticated than Napster. 144 Some of the first to
138. See id. (describing burden as shared).
139. SeeJohn Borland, Second Wave of Suits Crashes Against Napster, CNET NEWS.
COM, Mar. 7, 2001, (discussing that copies of songs performed at 2001 Grammy
Awards were being traded through Napster service), at http://news.cnet.com/
news/0-1005-200-5051378.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
140. See Sue Zeidler, EMusic Hits Napster with Copyright Lawsuit, REUTERS, Mar.
8, 2001, (comparing music alternatives to Napster), at http://www.infowar.com/
law/01/law030801awj.ghtml (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).
141. See Evan Hansen & Lisa M. Bowman, Court: Napster Filters Must Be Fool-
proof CNET NEWS.COM, July 12, 2001, (discussing that Judge Patel ordered not
even one copyrighted song to slip through Napster's file sharing system), at http:/
/news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6549898.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2001).
142. See id. (stating that after hearing, Napster said it would comply with
Judge Patel's order and that service would remain down until further notice).
143. For the text of the unpublished decision, see http://pub.bna.com/ptcj/
001369.pdf. The two joint ventures are MusicNet and Pressplay.
144. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Bootleg bonanza, MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 6, 2001,
(discussing that many new, improved services, are much easier to use than Nap-
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emerge included Gnutella, Aimster, Wrapster, OpenNap, CuteMX
and BearShare. 145 More recently, Dutch company FastTrack has
developed and licensed a peer-to-peer technology that is being used
to power a host of applications, including MusicCity's Morpheus,
KaZaA and Gorkster.146 All of the FastTrack applications share the
same network, and thus the wealth of materials available to users of
those services is staggering.' 47 The FastTrack applications also
speed up delivery time by simultaneously downloading pieces of a
file from several sources. a48
Another newcomer, AudioGalaxy, offers near CD-quality sam-
pling rates for its music downloads, up to 256 kilobits per second,
which is double the rate found on most file-swapping services. 149 In
contrast to most other services, AudioGalaxy also classifies its availa-
ble music according to genre (including obscure genres like cow
punk and organic house), which makes it easier for users to dis-
cover new music.' 50 One of the newest kids on the downloading
scene, Bitbop.com, is not a peer-to-peer service, because it only en-
ables users to record from internet radio stations.' 5 ' A user simply
enters the name of a favorite artist and the Bitbop Tuner will tune
into the radio station that is most likely to play songs by that art-
ist.15 2 When the station plays a song by the selected artist, it is
ripped from the radio stream and recorded onto the users' hard
ster) at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/ptech/tuneO905Ol.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 27, 2001).
145. See, e.g., http://www.gnutella.com; http://aimster.com; http://www.
cutemx.com; http://bearshare.com. Aimster has since changed its name to Mad-
ster. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Aimster Changes Name, Adds Fee Service, CNET NEWS,
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-821080.html (Jan. 23, 2002) (noting Madster
is still free but has added subscription service fees that offer better connectivity and
recommendations from other users).
146. See Chmielewski, supra note 144 (stating that FastTrack's new services
offer easier service, along with more selection compared to Napster).
147. See id. (comparing capabilities of various fast track applications).
148. See id. ("The intelligent download feature simultaneously pulls pieces of
the file from several sources to speed the transfer and to ensure that the file arrives
intact.").
149. See id. (noting AudioGalaxy does not come with its own media player).
150. See id. (explaining that users can sample several songs within preferred
genre or search entire "Galaxy" according to music style).
151. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Bitbop Tuner Scans Radio For Favorite Tunes, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 8, 2001, (discussing Bitbop's ability to allow consumers
to sample songs while waiting for favorite songs to be recorded on hard drive for
later use), at http://www.bitbop.com/press-bp20010508.html (last visited Dec. 27,
2001).
152. See id. (noting Bitbop's database contains thousands of Internet radio
stations).
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drive. 15 3 In contrast to the peer-to-peer services, music recorded
with Bitbop can only be played on the computer it was downloaded
to; it cannot be redistributed, copied to a portable player, or played
on other machines.
15 4
With their interconnectivity, increased speed, and improved
quality, the new generation of peer-to-peer file swapping technolo-
gies potentially pose an even graver risk to the music industry than
Napster. In contrast to Napster, they also threaten other copyright
holders as many of the newest and most powerful peer-to-peer ser-
vices, including the FastTrack technology, and are not limited to
sharing MP3 files, but rather facilitate sharing text and video files,
as well as computer software. 155 These systems are less centralized
and more difficult to police.1 56 Unlike Napster, most of the systems
do not store a list of available content on a central server, and thus
might arguably have no ability to control or police users'
activities. 157
Rather than suing their way through the Internet, content
providers may find their money better used developing technologi-
cal methods to protect online content, such as watermarking and
encryption technologies.1 58 Several new companies are offering
technologies specifically designed to prevent illegal copying of MP3
files. 159 One example, Audio Explosion, sells copyright-protected
MP3-formatted songs for use with digital players such as the Rio.1 60
Technology that enables copyright owners to track pirated music
153. See id. (noting approximately 100,000 users have downloaded Bitbop
Tuner between March 16, 2001 and May 7, 2001).
154. See id. ("Song files Bitbop finds are locked to the user's hard drive unlike
Napster - which allows its users to freely 'share' song files with thousands of
strangers.").
155. See Chmielewski, supra note 144 ("Anything that can be converted to bits
can be downloaded through KaZaA, Morpheus, and Gorkster: movies, books, mu-
sic videos and pictures.").
156. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Trading of Pirated Music Online Is Wider Than
Ever, MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 6, 2001, (discussing that many new online music ex-
changes have taken Napster's place), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/
depth/music090601.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2001).
157. See Chmielewski, supra note 144 (noting that files on iMesh are trans-
ferred without central server acting as traffic cop).
158. See Mike Snider, Tech tools fight entertainment piracy, USA TODAY, June 15,
2001, (discussing that most effective way to prevent digital copyright problems is
with tools blocking or tracking infringing uses), at http://www.usatoday.com/life/
cyber/tech/review/2001-03-06-copyright2.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2001).
159. See id. (stating "[w]hether future entertainment content such as music or
video rests on a PC hard drive, comes on a disc or gets beamed to the home via
satellite, technologies are being introduced to safeguard the goods").
160. See http://www.audio-explosion.com (offering audio and video technol-
ogy for automobiles and homes).
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on the Internet through intelligent search software is also availa-
ble. 161 Still, technological measures can be cracked. In this age of
sophisticated home computers and savvy hackers, even complex
copy protection schemes can be circumvented.
Changes to copyright law may also be of assistance to the RIAA
in dealing with illegal file swapping. Senator Fritz Hollings, a Dem-
ocrat from South Carolina and chairman of Senate Commerce
committee, has proposed the Security Systems Standards and Certi-
fication Act ("SSSCA").162 The SSSCA would make it a "civil of-
fense to create or sell any kind of computer equipment [or
consumer electronic device] that 'does not include and utilize certi-
fied security technologies' approved by the federal government."
' 63
The SSSCA also creates new federal crimes, punishable by up to five
years in prison and fines of up to $500,000 for anyone who sells or
distributes copyrighted material with security technologies disabled
or has a computer that disables copy protection. 164
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the RIAA's preliminary success in shutting down Nap-
ster, online distribution of music is certain to continue to grow in
popularity. It is equally clear that there will be continued efforts to
use the Internet to widely - and illegally - disseminate copyrighted
works. This new distribution medium will require a creative mix of
technological and legal solutions to balance the copyright holder's
interest in protecting copyrighted works against the public's inter-
est in accessing such works.
161. See Chris Oakes, Stamping Out Pirated Tunes, WIRED NEWS REPORT, Jan. 29,
2000, (discussing that one company, Copyright Control Services, tracks, docu-
ments, and shuts down Internet sites and communication channels containing ille-
gal files), at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,33940,00.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2001). Once a site containing illegal content is located, it can be easily
shut down by contacting the local ISP. See id. ISP's have a legal obligation under
the copyright law to keep their services free of infringing materials. See id.; see also
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 512, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-
86 (1998). If an ISP fails to act, then the ISP may find itself liable for contributory
copyright infringement. See § 512, 112 Stat. at 2877-86.
162. See Declan McCullagh, New Copyright Bill heading to DC, WIRED NEWS RE-
PORT, Sept. 7, 2001, (discussing that Senator Hollings is helping to instill copy-
protection restraints on consumer electronic devices and PC's), available at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46655,00.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2001).
163. Id. (explaining that Senator Hollings will introduce Security Systems
Standards and Certification Act, covering digital content, including music, video,
and e-books).
164. See id. (addressing that Act represents new copy protection from piracy
by creating new federal felonies for anyone found distributing copyrighted
material).
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